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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, every
conceivable government activity relating to the war on terror and
1
the war in Iraq has been explored, analyzed, and criticized. One
2
of the most elusive and effective tools in this war is covert action,
whereby the executive branch can take cloaked action and “fight
the terrorists overseas so we do not have to face them here at
3
home.” While the reasons for not disclosing the specifics of a
covert action to the American public are obvious, the process used
to initiate such actions can reasonably be held to a higher standard
of transparency.
Despite the existence of statutes and executive orders
attempting to clarify the responsibility of the executive branch to
4
disclose its plans for initiating a covert action, too much of the
process remains in the shadows of bureaucracy. None of the
existing law provides an accurate picture of how the President,
National Security Council (NSC), and Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) come to a decision to engage in a covert action. With whom
did the Executive Branch consult when it proposed to send covert
5
aid to influence the Iraq elections? Who gave the “go” order to
launch an American Predator drone and fire a Hellfire missile on a
group of Al Qaeda militants in Yemen that included an American
6
citizen? What was the role of senior congressional leaders in
determining whether such actions were aligned with the will of the
American public?
This article will assess the transparency and balance of the
current administrative process in place for developing and
executing a covert action. This assessment is conducted in four
parts. First, the article presents the history of the evolution of
1. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 200 (2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
2. See infra Part II.G. (stating the current definition of covert action in U.S.
statute).
3. President George W. Bush, Address to the American Legion National
Convention (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/
08/20060831-1.html.
4. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a, 413b (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,333,
46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
5. Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, Plan Called for Covert Aid in Iraq Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2005, at A6.
6. Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike, WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 2002, at A1.
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7

covert action in America from 1947 to the present. Second, this
article reviews the processes used by recent administrations in
8
approving covert action.
Third, the article provides a
comprehensive assessment of the process used by the current
administration to approve covert activity by analyzing current
9
trends and the execution of recent covert actions. Finally, changes
to the current system are recommended to increase the
transparency and oversight of the covert action process in the best
10
interests of the American public.
II. HISTORY OF COVERT ACTION
A. National Security Act of 1947
The CIA was created, and covert action was first authorized by
11
statute, through the National Security Act of 1947. The language
of the act was widely understood to authorize the chief executive to
12
approve covert actions at his discretion. While information on
authorized covert actions was available to Congress after the
passage of this act, few legislators showed an interest in covert
activities or requested briefings regarding their implementation
13
and execution until the 1970s.
Most members of Congress
believed that the conduct of secret actions was completely at the
14
Covert actions were primarily
discretion of the President.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Parts III.A–C.
9. See infra Part III.D.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). The act stated that the CIA, under the direction
of the NSC, had the duty to “perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may
from time to time direct.” Id. § 403(d)(5). The CIA was the successor to the
Office of Strategic Services and other small, World War II-era intelligence
organizations. See also U.S. Department of State, National Security Act of 1947,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17603.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
12. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 118
(1992). It has also been argued that the authority for conducting covert action
can be found in various statutes dealing with specific situations, such as the
Hostage Act of 1868. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) (“[w]henever it is made
known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly
deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government . . . the
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war . . . proper to obtain
or effectuate the release”).
13. WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, EXECUTIVE SECRETS: COVERT ACTION AND THE
PRESIDENCY 91 (2004).
14. Id. at 91–92.
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understood to be programs aimed at preventing the spread of
communism (in light of the Soviet threat), and Congress operated
under the assumption that such actions would be conducted in a
15
risk-minimizing manner.
B. Hughes-Ryan Amendment
The landscape of congressional oversight of covert activities
changed significantly in the 1970s. In the wake of the Vietnam War
and the Watergate scandal, combined with reports concerning the
conduct in previous covert actions, general mistrust of the
16
executive branch began to permeate American politics. Congress
responded to the executive branch’s apparent abuse of power by
passing, in 1974, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (Hughes-Ryan) to
17
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Hughes-Ryan added
significant parameters and checks on the process of approving
covert action.
First, the amendment added the express requirement that any
covert action authorized by the President must be important to the
18
national security of the United States.
Second, Hughes-Ryan attempted to significantly standardize
the process of issuing a covert action order by requiring a
19
“presidential finding.” A finding is a written document signed by
the President describing a contemplated action and listing all
20
governmental agencies and third parties to be involved.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982) (repealed 1991).
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other
Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until
the President finds that each such operation is important to the
national security of the United States. Each such operation shall be
considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the
purpose of Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Id.
18. See supra note 17 (quoting Hughes-Ryan language). See also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY,
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: AN
EVALUATION 20 (1985) [hereinafter ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION].
19. See supra note 17 (“unless and until the President finds”) (emphasis
added).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2000) (defining a finding, which is essentially the
same as what was stated in Hughes-Ryan).
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Information disclosed in the finding was to be “reported to the
21
congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible.” While
disclosure of information to Congress regarding covert actions
became required through Hughes-Ryan, the statute explicitly
excluded the report from being construed as a condition
22
precedent to the President’s power to authorize covert activities.
The real control conveyed to Congress by the advent of the
presidential finding was the creation of what amounted to a
23
congressional veto. By receiving information on covert actions in
advance of their execution (in most cases), Congress could execute
veto power over actions they deemed inappropriate by exercising
their constitutional right to approve or deny public funding for the
24
proposed action.
Finally, Hughes-Ryan marked the practical end of presidential
25
plausible deniability. Prior to the Amendment’s passage in 1974,
presidents dating back to Harry S. Truman “sought to strictly limit
the [executive branch’s] knowledge of covert action programs” so
the U.S. government could plausibly deny any covert action that
26
might be compromised or disclosed to the American public. This
was perhaps the most pivotal change in the process governing
covert action moving forward as a culture of deniability was
replaced with a more formalized system of accountability.
C. The Church Committee Report
An extensive investigation of all United States intelligence
agencies was conducted between 1975 and 1976 by the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, known as the “Church Committee” after
27
its chairman, Idaho Senator Frank Church. The committee’s final
21. Id. § 413b(c)(1). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment required a presidential
finding to be reported to eight different congressional committees:
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees of both the
House and Senate, as well as the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Id. See also
DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94.
22. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2) (2000) (“Nothing in [the Intelligence Oversight
Act] shall be construed as requiring the approval of the congressional intelligence
committees as a condition precedent.”) (emphasis added).
23. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 93–94.
26. Id.
27. The Church Committee published numerous reports during its tenure,
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28

report was Volume 7, entitled “Covert Action.”
The Church
Committee expressed concern over the amount of legislative
oversight involved in the approval of covert activities and
recommended that a permanent committee be established to
29
oversee the process.
The Senate responded by creating the
30
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
This committee was
given full authority to oversee the intelligence activities of the U.S.
31
and to authorize the appropriate funds.
The Church Committee’s findings led to a brief period of
inactivity by the executive branch. The Ford Administration’s
covert action record is limited, based both on a reduced number of
actions influenced by the Church Committee’s scrutiny, as well as
32
the inconsequential nature of the actions that were undertaken.
The Church Committee’s report, combined with the changes
implemented by Hughes-Ryan, led to a period of increased
congressional oversight of the process for approving covert action.
But that process would soon be limited by the next piece of
intelligence legislation.
D. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980
The process of authorizing covert action was streamlined
33
through the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. This act reduced
the number of congressional committees that the executive branch
all produced during the 94th Congress of the United States. The Assassination
Archives and Research Center’s Public Library, Church Committee, http://www.
aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006)
(publishing all fourteen released reports of the Church Committee). The topics
of the reports ranged from “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Substances” (Volume
1) to “Mail Opening” (Volume 4). Id. The Committee’s 7th volume was “Covert
Action” and centered on the U.S.-influenced overthrow of Chile’s democratically
elected socialist government in 1970. S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976).
28. S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976).
29. ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 7–8.
30. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted). This committee is “composed
of 15 members drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations
and Judiciary Committees, and from the Senate at large.” ABA INTELLIGENCE
EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 8. The House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence was not created until the 95th Congress and “consists of 16 members,
with membership drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs
and Judiciary Committees, as well as the House at large.” Id. See also H.R. Res. 658,
95th Cong. (1977) (enacted).
31. ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 8.
32. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 178.
33. Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981–82 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 413 (1982)) (adding Title V to the National Security Act of 1947).
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needed to contact with a presidential finding.
Hughes-Ryan
35
required that eight different congressional committees be
contacted and the Act changed the requirement to include only
36
the intelligence oversight committees.
Presumably, this
amendment to the covert action approval procedure reduced the
ultimate number of Senators and Congressmen who were informed
in advance of a covert action. By limiting the number of people
informed of the action, this amendment undoubtedly increased
both the secrecy of the approved action and the speed and
efficiency of the notification process.
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 also changed the
timeline under which the President needed to operate in notifying
the congressional intelligence committees of the President’s intent
to execute a covert action. Under Hughes-Ryan, the President was
required to inform Congress “in advance” of the execution of a
37
covert action.
The 1980 Act changed the requirement of
38
This “opaque
disclosure to notification in a “timely fashion.”
phrase” was not further defined in the Act and was interpreted by
some, including the Reagan Administration, as providing the
President with unrestricted discretion in choosing when to inform
39
Congress of a covert program.
This Act, and its application by the executive branch in the
1980s, marked a brief departure from the trend of increased
control by the legislative branch over covert activities.
E. Executive Orders 12,036 and 12,333
This shift away from increased congressional oversight of
covert actions was also mirrored by a subtle change in the extent of
40
In 1978, the
executive branch oversight of “special activities.”
Carter Administration issued Executive Order 12,036 to more
accurately define the role of the executive branch and other
34. Id.
35. See supra note 21 (listing eight congressional committees).
36. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94. The intelligence oversight committees
are the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. Id.
37. Id. at 93–94.
38. Id. at 97.
39. Id.
40. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,953–54 (Dec. 4, 1981);
Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3675 (Jan. 24, 1978) (repealed 1981)
(both orders defined covert actions as “special activities”).
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41

United States agencies in intelligence collection activities.
In
section 1-302, the 1978 order listed specifically those members of
the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC) that were to be
42
involved with all decisions concerning special activities. Included
in this list of committee members were the Attorney General and
43
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration issued Executive Order
44
This order repealed Executive Order 12,036 and
12,333.
amended many of the procedures the Carter Administration had
created. Most noticeably, Executive Order 12,333 removed the
specific listing of the members of the executive branch to be
involved in committee decisions regarding special activity (i.e.,
45
covert action) policy. Instead of maintaining a specific committee
containing specific members for handling such activities, the
Reagan Administration simply designated to the NSC the power to
“establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its
46
functions and responsibilities” under the new order.
By
instituting this change, the NSC could effectively include or
exclude anyone it chose from decisions and analysis of covert
activities. This change in the operation of the executive branch is
also indicative of the prevailing trend at the time of limiting the
amount of congressional oversight involved in the approval process
of covert actions.
F.

Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988

The fallout after the Iran-Contra Affair led Congress to
47
reassert legislative control over covert action. The Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1988 more strictly reigned in the President’s need
to communicate with Congress concerning proposed covert
actions.
As mentioned earlier, the Reagan Administration liberally
41. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 3674.
42. When considering special activity policy initiatives, the SCC was to include
“the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Director of Central Intelligence.” Id. at 3675.
43. Id.
44. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
45. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 120.
46. 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,942.
47. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 96–97.
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construed the meaning of the “timely fashion” language in the
48
This liberal use of the
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.
notification requirement resulted in a ten-month delay between
President Reagan’s decision to sell arms to Iran in exchange for
American hostages and the President’s notification to Congress
49
that these activities had taken place.
In response to the Reagan administration’s ultimate use of
discretion regarding congressional notification, Congress imposed
a forty-eight-hour time limit for the President to notify Congress of
50
a finding for covert activity.
This finite hour requirement
eliminated the “timely fashion” language and placed more pressure
on the executive branch to communicate with Congress within the
51
confines of a hard deadline. The forty-eight-hour requirement
was a more restrictive policy for the executive branch to follow, but
it did not eliminate the ability of the President to act in emergency
situations to protect the national interest without congressional
52
consultation.
G. Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991
The abuses committed by the executive branch in the IranContra affair led to Congress’s most significant modification of the
authorization process for covert actions.
The Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1991 (IAA of 1991) repealed Hughes-Ryan
and amended the National Security Act of 1947, imposing more
stringent requirements for the President to meet to execute a
53
covert action plan.
Despite the legislation passed regarding covert action before
1991, a statutory definition of covert action never reached U.S.

48. See supra text accompanying note 38.
49. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97.
50. Id. The forty-eight-hour requirement was reluctantly supported by fellow
Reagan Republicans such as Senator Arlen Specter (R–Pa.), who concluded that
the practice of prior notice had not worked in the past. Loch Johnson, Controlling
the CIA: A Critique of Current Safeguards, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 394 (1989).
But at the time the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 was passed, only four
violations of the prior-notice requirement had actually occurred since the passage
of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. Id. at 395 n.138.
51. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97.
52. Id.
53. Paul Gumina, Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991:
Effective Covert Action Reform or “Business as Usual”?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 149,
177 (1993).
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54

Code until passage of the 1991 Act. The IAA of 1991 defined
covert action as:
[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly, but does not include—
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence
activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain
the operational security of United States Government
programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or
routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted
by United States Government law enforcement
agencies or routine support to such activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt
activities (other than activities described in paragraph
(1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government
55
agencies abroad.
The passage of this statutory definition created the
requirement that the President comply with its provisions and align
proposed covert actions within the legal and factual framework of
56
the statute.
Unlike previous legislation, the IAA of 1991 created affirmative
57
actions for the President to take before executing a covert action.
58
The affirmative requirements of Title VI were passed to
54. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 123. Before 1991, covert action was
loosely defined through Executive Order No. 12,333 as “special activities,” which
meant
activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives
abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United
States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to
influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or
media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and
production of intelligence or related support functions.
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,953–54 (Dec. 4, 1981).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000) (the statutory language passed in 1991 is
identical to present language).
56. Gumina, supra note 53, at 181.
57. Id.
58. Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 amended Title V of
the National Security Act of 1947. Intelligence Authoritzation Act of 1991, Pub. L.
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specifically address particular abuses that had arisen out of the
59
First, the IAA of 1991 required that the
Iran-Contra Affair.
President “keep the congressional committees fully and currently
60
informed of all covert actions.” Second, Title VI required that the
President promptly inform the intelligence committees of any
illegal intelligence activity and provide an explanation of corrective
61
action taken to alleviate such illegal activity.
Finally, the Act
reaffirmed the Hughes-Ryan provision that a presidential finding
62
for a covert action must be in writing. Under the Act, the finding
was still subject to the forty-eight-hour reporting provision,
providing for instances when circumstances may not allow for an
63
advanced, published finding.
An additional wrinkle was also
added to ensure that these presidential findings did not function to
64
authorize actions that had already occurred.
The passing of the IAA of 1991 solidified and expanded the
shared powers arrangement enveloped in the original National
65
Security Act of 1947 and the amendments that followed. Through
passage of the IAA of 1991, the U.S. Government reasserted the
requirement of legislative involvement and public representation in
the approval of covert action. Adequate safeguards were included
to allow the Commander-in-Chief to make split-second decisions
66
pivotal to the safety of the nation under his executive power, but
No. 102-88, § 602, 105 Stat. 429, 441–44 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a, 413b
(2000)).
59. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97; Gumina, supra note 53, at 177.
60. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)(1) (2000). This portion of the act was a response to
the delinquency with which President Reagan had acted in informing anyone
outside of the executive branch of the plan to trade arms with the Iranians in
exchange for the release of American hostages. See Gumina, supra note 53, at
168–74 (recounting the specifics of the Iran-Contra Affair and subsequent
executive cover-up).
61. Gumina, supra note 53, at 177. The inclusion of this clause in the original
act was at the recommendation of the Iran-Contra Committee. See Senate Select
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition,
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair with
Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, S. Rep. No. 216, H.R. Rep. No. 433,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Committee Report].
62. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(1) (2000).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 413b(a)(2). The elimination of post hoc authorization of covert
actions by presidential finding was the result of a finding of the Iran-Contra
Investigative Committee. Iran-Contra Committee Report, supra note 61, at 424
(Recommendation No. 7). See also Gumina, supra note 53, at 178 n.182.
65. Gumina, supra note 53, at 183.
66. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(1) (2000) (stating that “[e]ach finding shall be in
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the frustration inherent in past failures and abuses of power were
affirmed in statutory language that increased the role of Congress
in the execution of covert activity.
III. AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR COVERT ACTION
The IAA of 1991 was the last piece of major legislation passed
that significantly amended the process for authorizing and
67
68
executing a covert action. As history has shown, the regulations
passed via statute for approving covert action only provide a
general framework under which the executive branch is to operate
when determining how to carry out its plans for secretive, nonmilitary activity. To decipher the more intricate process followed
by the Commander-in-Chief, NSC, and CIA to execute a covert
plan, it is necessary to investigate the procedures developed by past
presidential administrations. While it is difficult to uncover exactly
what occurs behind the closed doors of the West Wing and CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia, events transpiring under the
watch of America’s four most recent presidents (and covered by
journalists) have shed some light on the process leading to the
69
execution of covert activity.
After a brief look back at the processes used by the Reagan,
George H. W. Bush, and Clinton Administrations, this article will
attempt to piece together a comprehensive picture of the process
in place under the current George W. Bush presidency. The events
of September 11, 2001 and the war on terror have revitalized the
use of covert action. At the time of this writing, no thorough
writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does
not permit the preparation of a written finding”); § 413b(c)(2) (limiting the
number of people to be informed through a finding of a planned covert action if
“extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States” exist).
67. All other amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 were minor
changes in verbiage and had no significant effect on the operation of the statute.
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458,
§ 1071(a)(1), 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (substituting “Director of National
Intelligence” for “Director of Central Intelligence”); Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-306, § 353(b), 116 Stat. 2383, 2402 (2002)
(striking “Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives” and replacing
it with “congressional intelligence committees,” which is defined as).
68. See supra Part II.
69. Prominent journalists consistently covering the government’s activity in
covert channels include Dana Priest (Washington Post), Douglas Jehl (New York
Times), James Risen (New York Times), and Seymour M. Hersh (The New
Yorker).
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analysis of the process in place has been assembled in available
legal literature.
A. The Reagan Administration
The advent of the presidential finding and other regulations
mandated by Hughes-Ryan led to the institution of official,
standardized, and specific processes for approving covert activities
70
A President could no
starting with the Carter Administration.
longer deny knowledge of covert actions, necessitating a process of
review by intelligence experts and other members of the
President’s cabinet to ensure that actions undertaken would
71
withstand possible future legal and social scrutiny.
The momentum generated through the covert action
authorization process implemented by President Carter motivated
the Reagan Administration to also formulate formal authorization
72
measures.
In 1985, National Security Decision Directive-159
(NSDD-159), Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination
Procedures, was passed, formally implementing the internal process
73
adopted by the Reagan Administration.
As has been the case
since 1974, the President was the catalyst for starting the process of
74
researching a proposed covert action.
After the President’s
request, the planning stages of the proposed action would pass
through the White House’s Planning and Coordination Group
75
76
(PCG) and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG).
Until the Iran-Contra Affair, the final execution order for a covert
action plan could be given by either the President or a member of
70. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 99; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND
PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, 1977–1981, 59–63 (1983);
Loch Johnson, Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America’s Secret
Foreign Policy, 33 INT’L STUD. Q. 81, 97–98 (1989).
71. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 98–99.
72. Id. at 100.
73. Id. at 101. This directive was implemented on January 18, 1985. Id.
NSDD’s are confidential documents, but certain of these directives have been
declassified, at least in part. See Russell J. Bruemmer & Marshall H. Siverberg, The
Impact of the Iran-Contra Matter on Congressional Oversight of the CIA, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 235 (1988) (providing an excerpted version of NSDD-286).
74. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 110–11.
75. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101. The PCG, “which was composed of
high-level representatives (often the deputies) from the Departments of State and
Defense and other relevant agencies, was to review all covert action programs
current and proposed.” Id.
76. The NSPG was essentially the NSC and the heads of any other
departments involved in the project. Id.
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77

the NSC staff.
The abuses of Iran-Contra led to NSDD-286,
Approval and Review of Special Activities, which eliminated the NSC’s
participation in covert action operations and reserved the power to
execute these activities in the hands of the CIA or another
department empowered by the President in compliance with the
78
National Security Act of 1947.
The Reagan Administration was the first to fully implement a
formalized procedure, and that procedure is still very much in
79
effect today.
B. The George H. W. Bush Administration
As the successor to the Reagan Administration in which he
80
served as Vice President, George H. W. Bush did little to change
the process of approving covert action. Bush essentially carried on
the process created during the Reagan Administration and
81
attempted to remove himself from the abuses of Iran-Contra. The
end of the Cold War allowed President Bush to terminate many
82
covert operations because the Soviet threat had subsided. The
majority of the covert actions executed during this period remain
83
classified and have not been officially acknowledged.

77. Id.
78. Id. See also 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2000). The current statute reflects the
codification of the covert action process by the IAA of 1991, and the statute has
not since been amended. Id.
79. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101. The George H. W. Bush
Administration followed the Reagan Administration’s model of approval almost
exactly. Id. Only the names of the established committees were changed. Id. The
PCG became the “Deputies Committee” and the NSPG became the “Principals
Committee.” Id.
80. Bush served as Vice President to Ronald Reagan from 1981–1989 before
winning the presidential election in 1988. Biography of George H. W. Bush, THE
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gb41.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2007).
81. Bush testified during Iran-Contra investigations that he was “out of the
loop” with regard to arms transactions with Iran, but that he did know that such
transactions had occurred. See Excerpts from the Iran-Contra Report: A Secret Foreign
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A10 (reprinting excerpts from the final report
by Independent Counsel for the Iran-Contra Affair, Lawrence E. Walsh).
82. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 216. The number of presidential findings
issued annually dropped from more than thirty to less than ten during the first
Bush administration. Id.
83. Id.
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C. The Clinton Administration
The Clinton presidency adopted many of the same procedures
developed and followed by the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
but continued to build on the process already in place by adding
additional checks and balances to the approval process of covert
84
actions.
All directives to generate proposals from the Clinton White
House came from either President Clinton or the National Security
85
Advisor. The request was then forwarded to CIA headquarters,
where numerous internal reviews would take place, depending on
86
the nature of the proposed action. During the CIA’s approval
process, attorneys from the CIA’s Office of General Counsel
(OGC) would review the proposed action at every step of its
87
approval and address any legal issues that arose.
After the
proposal had been addressed (and amended as needed) by two
88
high-level committees at the CIA, the proposed action plan would
be given to the OGC for one final assessment of legal issues before
being transferred back to the White House by either the Director
89
of Central Intelligence or his deputy.
After the proposal returned to the White House, another

84. See id. at 216–17; ROBERT M. GATES, FROM THE SHADOWS: THE ULTIMATE
INSIDER’S STORY OF FIVE PRESIDENTS AND HOW THEY WON THE COLD WAR 379 (1996);
Johnson, supra note 70, at 94–95. Clinton formally adopted many of the existing
approval procedures through Presidential Decision Directive-2, Organization of the
National Security Council on January 20, 1993. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 216.
85. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101. Excluding the CIA, any executive
agency with responsibilities in foreign policy or national security could suggest
possible actions to the NSC, but only the President or National Security Director
could set the CIA in motion to start the actual planning process. Id. at 101–02.
86. See id. at 103–04. The CIA would incorporate those operatives that would
eventually be in charge of managing the execution of the proposed action, taking
into account location, specific issues, and the possible need for department of
defense assistance. Id. at 103.
87. See id. at 103–05.
88. The two primary review groups in the CIA are the Covert Action Planning
Group (CAPG) and the Covert Action Review Group (CARG). See id. at 104. The
CAPG is defined as the top of the CIA’s “directorate” level; this committee refines
the proposal based on operational concerns, cost-benefit analysis, the risk of
failure, and other functional concerns. Id. The CARG does much of the same,
but takes into consideration the reactions of Congress, more nuanced legal issues,
and the compliance of the proposal with administration policy. Id. at 105. The
CARG has been referred to as “the top echelon of CIA management.” JEFFREY T.
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 431 (3d ed. 1995).
89. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 105.
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90

multi-layered review process would take place. The proposal was
first analyzed by the Interagency Working Group for Covert Action
(IWG), a collection of representatives from major executive branch
agencies, who would review the major policy objectives, legality,
and coordination of agencies needed to execute the planned
91
action.
After the IWG finished multiple screenings of the
proposed action and finding, the proposal would move through
92
the Deputies and Principals Committees for final approval. The
proposed presidential finding and attached details were then sent
to the President for his signature and passed on to Congress within
93
the mandated forty-eight-hour period required by statute.
The process in the Clinton White House was regimented and
relatively straightforward.
Great importance was placed on
thorough analysis and the participation of all relevant agencies to
94
the proposed action. At present, there appears to be no evidence
alleging that this process was not followed for any particular action
of record.
D. George W. Bush and the Current Process
Shortly after taking office in 2001, George W. Bush signed a
presidential directive that retained the majority of the covert action
95
approval process used by President Clinton. From the outset, it
90. Id.
91. Id. at 105–06. The Clinton Administration followed the guideline passed
in the Reagan administration’s NSDD-286 that required as many thirteen different
agencies to participate in this planning process. Id. Included were representatives
from the Department of State, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Office of Management and Budget, CIA, and the Justice Department. Id. at 106.
92. Id. at 106–07. The Deputies Committee was a “grouping of the numbertwo officials” in each department relevant to the proposed action; the Principals
Committee was chaired by the National Security Advisor and included the heads
of all relevant departments. Id.
93. Id. at 107. The finding itself was usually no more than two pages in
length and contained the reason that the action was in the national interest, the
foreign policy goals to be achieved, and scope of the proposed action. Id. at
109–10. The supporting document was where the details of the operation were
found. Id. at 110.
94. Richard Clarke assessed and contrasted the different review habits of
President Clinton and George W. Bush. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL
ENEMIES 243 (2004). Clarke describes Clinton “plowing” through documents well
past midnight and calling universities for additional information after exhausting
the knowledge of his staff. Id. Clarke recounts that Bush, on the other hand, was
“not a big reader,” received his briefings from a small group of senior advisers, and
went to bed by 10:00 p.m. Id.
95. Memorandum from George W. Bush (Feb. 13, 2001), http://www.fas.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/7

16

Bobich: Note: Who Authorized this?!: An Assessment of the Process for App
12. BOBICH - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:05:08 PM

WHO AUTHORIZED THIS?!

1127

appeared that the Bush Administration would continue the current
trend of regimented oversight and approval for covert activity. But
the world changed dramatically just seven months after the signing
of this directive and the focus shifted immediately to the securing
of America’s borders from a new and evolving threat. In the wake
of the war on terror and the war in Iraq, little time has been spent
analyzing exactly how the current Administration is authorizing the
covert activity it deems necessary to confront these new conflicts.
This section aims to shed some light on that policy and to illustrate
the covert action approval process as it exists today.
1.

Pre-9/11 Covert Action Policy

The Bush Administration’s process for authorizing covert
action started to form before the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The threat of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden was a fear
communicated to the Bush Administration by Clinton holdovers
96
such as National Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke.
The terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda eventually prompted
President Bush to tell his top aides: “I want to take the fight to the
97
terrorists.” After this general directive, the responsibility of asking
the CIA to prepare plans for an expansive covert action plan to
deter terrorist activities fell on President Bush’s new National
98
Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Rice requested that the CIA
“prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in
99
Afghanistan” to deter the al Qaeda threat.
This request,
according to Rice, was based on a proposition by Richard Clarke
100
and NSC senior director for intelligence Mary McCarthy.
org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm (National Security Presidential Directive-1,
entitled Organization of the National Security System). Bush eliminated the
Interagency Working Groups and replaced them with a network of Policy
Coordinating Committees (PCC). DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 240–41 n.21.
96. CLARKE, supra note 94, at 227–32. Clarke recounts telling Condoleezza
Rice, Steven Hadley, Dick Cheney, and Colin Powell in January 2001 that al Qaeda
was at war with the U.S. and that an appropriate offensive response to al Qaeda’s
planned terrorist activities was necessary to U.S. security. Id. at 227. Clarke kept
the title of National Counterterrorism Coordinator in the Bush Administration,
but his authority was diminished and he was required to report to the Deputies
Committee rather than directly to the Principals Committee. 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 200.
97. Barton Gellman, A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002,
at A1.
98. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 210.
99. Id.
100. Id. The idea of extended covert activity against terrorists in Afghanistan
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The CIA came back to Rice and the NSC with options for
covert action in Afghanistan, including the launching of an
101
unmanned Predator drone operated by the CIA.
This proposed
covert action was discussed within the Deputies Committee upon its
return to the White House, but technical issues with the drone kept
102
the planned action from being launched.
Because the project
was never actually executed, a presidential finding was never signed
and congressional notification never took place.
This first example of the Bush Administration’s approval
process for a covert action highlights some similarities to the
process followed by previous administrations, but there are also
some marked differences. The general structure of the process
appears to be similar to that of the Clinton Administration, with the
directive to the CIA coming from the National Security Adviser by
103
way of the President.
The planning stages for the proposed
Predator drone missions started with the CIA and were then passed
back to the White House to undergo review by the NSC deputies
104
and, eventually, by the principals.
A peculiar difference in the process appears to be the lack of
direct involvement by the President in the initial tasking of the CIA
to pursue the planning stages of covert activity. The proposed
missions against al Qaeda in Afghanistan were largely hatched
during the previous administration, and it was the pitch of those
plans (by Clinton holdovers) to National Security Adviser Rice that
was in conjunction with an earlier strategic proposal to provide covert aid to the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan after fighting broke out in the country, as well as
aid to Uzbekistan to achieve similar goals. Id. at 202–03. The peculiar part of
Clarke’s involvement at this point in the process was the fact that he had
essentially been demoted to a position subordinate to the deputies committee. Id.
at 200. Involvement by an individual with this level of authority, at this point in
the process, was rare in previous administrations. Id. See supra Parts III.A.–C. See
also CLARKE, supra note 94, at 230 (describing the change in the chain of
command in the Bush administration and to whom Clarke was to report).
101. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 210–12. The drone was a
prototype produced by the Air Force for reconnaissance purposes. CLARKE, supra
note 94, at 220–22. The Predator drone was developed to carry a Hellfire missile
at the behest of the NSC and Department of Defense. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 211. A debate also occurred as to whether the CIA would have the
legal authority to operate the drone, equipped with a missile, to kill members of al
Qaeda and still be in compliance with the assassination ban stated in Executive
Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981). 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 211–12.
102. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 212.
103. Id. at 202–12.
104. Id.
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105

set the project in motion.
As stated earlier, President Bush gave
the general authorization to go on the offensive, but any further
involvement by the President in the planning of the goals of the
106
action appears limited.
Another characteristic of the Bush Administration’s covert
action approach highlighted by this early activity was the expansive
scope such actions were intended to take.
The growing
momentum for an initiative against al Qaeda lead to the drafting of
a National Security Presidential Directive, including extensive
107
covert programs, in June 2001.
From the beginning, the Bush Administration planned to push
the limits of what covert action was classically authorized to
accomplish. In September 2001, the CIA was told to draft new
“legal authorities for the ‘broad covert action program’ envisioned
108
by the draft presidential directive.”
These new legal parameters
were to include the “‘authority to capture or to use lethal force’
109
against al Qaeda.” This legal posturing was necessary in order to
absolve the CIA from any liability based on the ban against
110
assassinations in Executive Order 12,333.
The Bush
Administration intended to blur the lines of what could be
accomplished through covert action as long as the legal authority
could be found.
2.

The Post-9/11 Finding—A New Scope of Covert Action

After dealing with the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President
111
This war
Bush assembled his “war council” at Camp David.
105. Id. at 210; CLARKE, supra note 94, at 237–38.
106. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 202–12. President Bush’s
dependence on his cabinet for information and to make decisions is also
highlighted by Vice President Dick Cheney’s attendance at NSC Principals
meetings starting in January 2001 (something no previous vice president had ever
done). CLARKE, supra note 94, at 228. Cheney was also appointed by President
Bush in May 2001 to head a task force aimed at assessing terrorist threats and
attacks by weapons of mass destruction. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at
204.
107. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 204.
108. Id. at 214.
109. Id.
110. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981)
(stating in section 2.11 that “[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the
United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination”).
111. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 332. President Bush’s war
council consisted of Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor
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council meeting set into motion the U.S. response to the al Qaedaled attacks on September 11, including an extensive covert action
112
program.
On September 17, 2001, the NSC convened in the
White House and President Bush pushed his advisers to put the
CIA into covert action operations immediately, stating, “I want to
113
sign a finding today. I want the CIA to be first on the ground.”
Acting on the President’s directive, Bush’s cabinet amended a
pre-9/11 presidential directive for actions against al Qaeda into
National Security Presidential Directive 9 (NSPD-9), entitled
114
“Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.”
This new
directive expanded the previous directive to encompass a
worldwide war on terrorism, not just activities against al Qaeda
115
alone.
Included in this directive was a presidential finding for
covert action, drafted by the CIA and approved by CIA director
116
George Tenet.
The finding formally expanded the CIA’s power
to include the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists when
117
This finding
engaging in global counterterrorism activities.
Condoleezza Rice, Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert
Mueller, CIA Director George Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
and Cofer Black, Director, DCI Counterterrorism Center. Id. This meeting of the
war council took place September 15–16, 2001. Id.
112. Id. CIA Director Geroge Tenet proposed inserting CIA teams into
Afghanistan to work with opposition to the Taliban to try to find Osama bin Laden
and fight against al Qaeda. Id.
113. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 97 (2002).
114. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 333.
The NSPD called on the Secretary of Defense to plan for military options
‘against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, commandcontrol, air and air defense, ground forces, and logistics.’ The NSPD also
called for plans ‘against al Qida [sic] and associated terrorist facilities in
Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control-communications,
training, and logistics facilities.’
Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2004/04/20040401-4.html#16. Aside
from the White House’s depiction of NSPD-9 and general testimony received by
the 9/11 Commission, NSPD-9 is a classified document. Federation of American
Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, NSPD-9: Combating Terrorism,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-9.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter FAS Intelligence Resource Program].
115. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 333.
116. WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 76.
117. Id. This presidential finding was not the first authorization of lethal force
through covert action issued by a President. President Clinton authorized the use
of lethal force against al Qaeda in 1998. Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs ‘Targeted
Killing’ Missions; Administration Believes Restraints Do Not Bar Singling Out Individual
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provided the CIA with the “broadest and most lethal authority in its
118
history.”
The process leading to the final approval of the post-9/11
covert action finding was relatively similar to the process followed
by previous administrations. First, the proposal of new covert
activity was presented by the head of the CIA and expanded on a
plan that had already been submitted for presidential approval on
119
September 4, 2001. As discussed previously, the original proposal
from the CIA was requested by National Security Advisor Rice after
120
discussions with President Bush.
Thus, the authority for
researching and developing this plan for covert action started with
a request from the White House. The start of the process for
approving the broad post-9/11 finding was, therefore, similar to
the process followed in the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
121
Clinton Administrations.
Second, the plan for covert action and the proposed
presidential finding were reviewed and approved by principals and
deputies of the presidential cabinet. But the review by the deputies
and principals in this case occurred in a slightly different fashion.
The approval of the finding signed by President Bush on
September 17, 2001 only underwent the review of the war cabinet
principals and their deputies during the Camp David briefings of
122
September 15–16, 2001. It does not appear that the final finding
Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at A1.
118. WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 78. The authority was viewed as broader
than the force authorized by Clinton in 1998 because it expanded the CIA’s power
to use lethal force in all aspects of a “secret global war on terror,” and not just
against al Qaeda. Id. See also Gellman, supra note 117, at A1 (“Bush’s directive
broadens the class of potential targets beyond bin Laden and his immediate circle
of operational planners, and also beyond the present boundaries of the fight in
Afghanistan, officials said.”). The finding also allowed for the narrower planning
of the death of an individual, something that had not been expressed in findings
by previous presidents. Id.
119. Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Prepared for
Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Mar. 23, 2004), at 7, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/
rumsfeld_statement.pdf [hereinafter Rumsfeld Testimony].
120. See supra Part III.D.1.
121. See supra Parts III.A.–C.
122. See WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 101. The finding was actually included
in a Memorandum of Notification which served to modify an intelligence finding
on worldwide counterterrorism signed by President Reagan in 1986. Id. at 76. See
also supra note 111 (listing the members of the war council). The author could
not find the actual title and number of the Reagan finding, likely a National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD), probably because this document is still
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was ever formally resubmitted to the Principals and Deputies
Committees for comment (as was commonly the process for
approval in previous administrations). But given the abbreviated
timeline created by 9/11 and the impromptu meeting of the war
council, it is not surprising that this seemingly bureaucratic process
of reconvening the Principals and Deputies Committees was not
123
followed in this particular phase of the finding’s authorization.
The final statutory component of the covert action approval
process, congressional notification, was less clear in this instance.
President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the
American people on September 20, 2001, proclaiming that “covert
operations, secret even in success” would be utilized to defeat the
124
terrorist threat.
After this point, if not before, the intent of the
Bush administration to use covert action as a weapon against the
terrorist threat was obvious. But precisely when the appropriate
members of Congress were notified of the confidential specifics of
the planned covert activity is hard to determine. Officials from the
first four years of the Bush Administration have gone on record to
say that congressional leaders were notified of approved covert
actions within the required forty-eight-hour period specified by
125
statute.
At this point, there is no evidence leading to the
conclusion that the Administration did not follow the proper
congressional reporting procedures required by the National
126
Security Act of 1947. It is unlikely that such a reporting violation
occurred, given the scrutiny the Bush Administration has been
classified. See FAS Intelligence Resource Program, supra note 114, at http://
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (listing all known NSDDs of the
Reagan Administration) (last visited October 31, 2006). It appears that NSDD 217
is a likely candidate; NSDD 217 is the only NSDD issued in 1986 that is still
completely confidential, and no other listed titles allude to the nature of the
described directive. See id.
123. As already discussed, the presidential finding issued for covert activity
after 9/11 was an addition and revision to NSPD-9, which had already gone
through the standard approval process (including review by the principals and
deputies committees). See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 212–14; see
also Rumsfeld Testimony, supra note 119, at 7 (stating that NSPD-9 had been
researched, prepared, and submitted to the President for approval on September
4, 2001).
124. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html.
125. See James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for al Qaeda,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at A1.
126. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2000) (detailing proper congressional reporting
procedures).
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subject to with regard to pre- and post-9/11 national security
activities.
3.

The Bush Covert Action Authorization Process Today

Despite the structured process executed by the Bush
Administration to authorize certain covert activity shortly after
September 11, 2001, recent developments and investigative
reporting have called into question the Administration’s continued
use of this process. Is all covert action planned and executed in the
war on terror and the war in Iraq subject to the same layered
analysis used in 2001?
a.

GST and the Use of Lethal Force

The finding that President Bush signed on September 17, 2001
has expanded into a broad-based covert action program known by
127
the initials GST. The broad power granted to the CIA under the
original finding has allowed the Administration, through extensive
legal interpretation, to substantially increase the ability of GST
operatives to engage in lethal activity against al Qaeda members in
128
just about any part of the world. Due to the broad nature of the
finding and the Administration’s interpretation of it, additional
covert actions have been executed by the CIA without the need to
129
seek further approval.
The elimination of the need to approve every covert activity is
most evident in the execution of the Administration’s “high-value
target list,” which authorizes the CIA to hunt down and kill specific
130
terrorists.
In authorizing this list and the lethal authority
associated with it, President Bush “provided written legal authority

127. Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
2005, at A1. GST “is an abbreviation of a classified code name for the umbrella
covert action program” aimed at fighting the war on terror. Id.
128. Id. The Administration’s primary legal justification for its lethal acts is
one of self-defense based on the resolution passed by Congress on September 14,
2001, authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” Id. (quoting the resolution).
129. Jonathan Ulrich, The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President’s Authority
to Order Targeted Killing in the War Against Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1029, 1042–43
(2005).
130. Risen & Johnston, supra note 125. The target list includes roughly two
dozen al Qaeda leaders, defined as the “worst of the worst,” including Osama bin
Laden and his chief deputies. Id.
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to the CIA to hunt down and kill the terrorists without seeking
further approval each time the agency is about to stage an
131
operation.”
Presumably, the written legal authority provided by
the President was in the form of a presidential finding. But it is
unclear whether the written authority is in the original finding
issued in 2001, or another finding that defines the particular act of
hunting down and killing specific terrorists.
Critics of the GST program are skeptical of the validity of the
program’s legal justification, arguing that the Administration has
essentially written itself a blank check “to do anything” in the war
132
on terror.
This wide-ranging power has given the CIA extensive
power to execute covert actions without additional oversight,
allegedly leading to extensive day-to-day decision making by the
133
head of the CIA and others.
The delegation of power has
allegedly filtered down to the point where the Director of the CIA
can pass the authority to execute killings against al Qaeda members
134
to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center.
The distribution of authority to lower ranks raises the question
of whether covert actions executed under the GST program comply
with statutory requirements. When the National Security Act of
1947 refers to the President’s authority to conduct “a covert
135
action,” how broadly can such an action be construed? Does
136
Can the
each individual act need to be reported to Congress?
131. Id.
132. Priest, supra note 127, at A1.
133. Id. According to congressional and intelligence officials, President Bush
delegated much of the decision-making responsibility for covert actions, including
targeted killings, to former CIA Director George Tenet. Id.
134. Id. One of the most controversial covert actions executed since
September 2001 is the pilotless Predator drone missile strike in Yemen in
November 2002 that killed an American citizen. Priest, supra note 6, at A1. The
dissemination of power to those in lower-ranking CIA positions poses the question
of whether the President had knowledge of this particular strike. If he did not,
would the strike have been executed if the President was the one giving the order
to fire and knew of the presence of a U.S. citizen with the target?
135. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2000).
136. Allegations have also been made that the Bush Administration limited the
number of Congressional members informed of its covert plans to four: the
chairmen and ranking Democratic members of the House and Senate intelligence
committees. Priest, supra note 127, at A1. If this did occur, the administration
would be in violation of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires, at
minimum, that eight members of Congress be informed within forty-eight hours
of the ordering of any covert action. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(2) (2000).
If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to
meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,
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authority to execute any particular action under a finding be
granted to anyone but the President himself? While the original
finding for covert activity in 2001 was subject to an extensive review
process, each individual action since the issuing of that finding
appears to be subject to a decreasing standard of approval and
review.
b.

The Iraq Elections

A second situation eliciting questions about the Bush
Administration’s process for approving covert activity is the
suspicion that the United States secretly influenced Iraq’s first free
elections in January 2005. In the months leading up to the January
30th election, President Bush approved a covert action plan to
137
provide support to certain Iraqi candidates and political parties.
But this plan was met with considerable opposition starting in
October 2004 when Congress was notified of the proposed
138
finding.
Certain members of Congress opposed any secret
influence by the United States in the Iraq election because such
activity would, in their view, obviously compromise the U.S.
Government’s stated commitment to sponsoring a free, unfettered
139
election.
The President rescinded the proposed finding in light
of the congressional opposition, but allegations have persisted that
the Bush Administration went forward with its plan to influence the
Iraq election by hiring “retired CIA officers and other nongovernment personnel, and us[ing] funds that were not necessarily

the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the
congressional leadership as may be included by the President.
Id. (emphases added).
137. Jehl & Sanger, supra note 5.
138. Id. Timothy J. Burger & Douglas Waller, Notebook: How Much U.S. Help?,
TIME, Oct. 4, 2004, at 17.
139. Seymour M. Hersh, Get Out the Vote; Did Washington Try to Manipulate Iraq’s
Election?, NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 52, 55; Jehl & Sanger, supra note 5. House
Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi was reported to be the most heated opponent of
the planned election intervention. Berger & Waller, supra note 138, at 17. Pelosi
allegedly had a heated phone conversation with then National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice, in which Pelosi stated, in essence, “‘Did we have eleven
hundred Americans die’—the number of U.S. combat deaths as of September
2004—‘so [Iraq] could have a rigged election?’” Hersh, supra, at 55; see also Jehl &
Sanger, supra note 5.
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140

appropriated by Congress.”
The original plan appears to have followed a method of review
141
and approval similar to the Administration’s post-9/11 finding,
culminating in a submission of the finding to the appropriate
congressional intelligence committees for review. If an additional
142
“off the books” plan was executed by third parties hired by the
U.S. Government, such an action would be in direct violation of the
143
Some members of the White
National Security Act of 1947.
House and Pentagon are reported to believe that when an
operation is kept secret and “off the books,” the action is not
official and therefore does not require the congressional
144
notification used in regular covert actions.
If this is a prevailing
attitude within the current Administration and covert action was
indeed executed in Iraq without credence to statutory regulations,
this presents a disturbing trend. If the executive branch can
execute any covert activity it deems necessary as long as it finds an
outside source through which to carry out its plans, important
oversight and regulation provided by governmental checks and
balances are lost.
In summary, recent covert actions authorized by the Bush
Administration appear to be creating a precedent of only a cursory
review process for proposed activity. The power to execute
proposed actions is becoming further removed from the direct
oversight of the President, and when the Administration finds
opposition to its plans, it appears that the executive branch is
simply creating ways to circumvent that opposition. To ensure that
the process leading to the approval of these very powerful actions is
appropriately transparent and subject to proper scrutiny, certain
changes should be made to the current system.

140. Hersh, supra note 139, at 55.
141. See supra Part III.D.2. But the exact approval process used before
submission of the document to Congress has not been reported publicly.
142. Hersh, supra note 139, at 55.
143. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(4) (2000) (“Each finding shall specify whether it is
contemplated that any third party . . . will be used to fund or otherwise participate
in any significant way in the covert action concerned . . . .”).
144. See Hersh, supra note 139, at 55 (reporting that “[s]ome in the White
House and at the Pentagon believed that keeping an operation off the books
eliminated the need to give a formal briefing to the relevant members of Congress
and congressional intelligence committees, whose jurisdiction is limited, in their
view, to officially sanctioned CIA operations”).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE COVERT ACTION APPROVAL PROCESS
In his analysis of U.S. intelligence policies and safeguards
against CIA abuses in 1989, long-time national security and political
science scholar Loch Johnson opined: “Intelligence policy for the
most part has become more of a partnership between the branches
[of government] than ever before. American democracy works
best as a partnership among the branches of government and not
145
through reliance on the executive branch alone.”
Johnson’s
assessment of the strengths of the American form of government is
particularly prudent given the current state of affairs in the
approval process for covert action. The execution of covert action
has become unequivocally dependent upon the executive branch
alone, and changes need to be made to ensure that balance,
transparency, and accountability return to this very powerful
intelligence tool. Two plausible ways to achieve these goals are an
improved system of retrospective congressional review and better
composition of the congressional intelligence committees.
A. Retrospective and Independent Congressional Review
For the power of the executive branch to be appropriately
checked and for the will of the American people to be represented,
Congress must play a crucial role in the process that governs the
planning and implementation of covert actions. But given the
evolving nature of the threats against which the United States must
protect its citizens, a more cumbersome preliminary approval
process could severely infringe upon the President’s ability to react
quickly and effectively to imminent dangers. For this reason, and
for reasons of congressional and executive efficiency, congressional
oversight of the covert action process should be focused on
146
retrospective analysis and judgment of executed covert actions.
In a great many cases, anticipated covert actions can undergo a
thorough analysis and genuine democratic debate before their
145. Johnson, supra note 50, at 389. Johnson also quoted former Director of
Central Intelligence William Colby as observing that “in the future, covert action
mistakes ‘will be American mistakes. They will not be CIA mistakes, but mistakes
of the administration and the Congress in power.’” Id. at 388–89.
146. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 143. Reisman and Baker also
postulated that “[c]overt actions . . . require an executive . . . [b]ut democracies
also require that executive actions be subjected to oversight and appraisal.” Id.
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147

implementation. This is one of the reasons that the requirement
of congressional notification before execution of a covert action
148
exists in federal statute and can only be delayed or limited in
149
“extraordinary circumstances.”
But in the current environment
of terrorist threats, the United States and its chief executive must
operate under an ever-changing timeline to combat an enemy that
President Bush characterized as one “that lurks and plots and plans
150
and wants to hurt America again.” To meet this new and evolving
threat, every effort should be made by the President and his
cabinet to inform Congress of planned covert activity, but it is
unrealistic to think that each and every action will be open to
debate. The effectiveness of many covert actions in the war on
terror will be based on the ability to execute the actions quickly and
without significant bureaucratic delay.
It is therefore vitally important that Congress, specifically the
congressional intelligence committees, focus their energies on
evaluating covert actions after they have occurred or during their
execution.
Through thorough retrospective evaluations and
recommendations, perceived mistakes or abuses related to covert
activity can be evaluated and changes can be made in the future.
According to William Daugherty, former chief of the Covert Action
151
[policy] Group in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, from the
Reagan Administration through the Clinton Administration, there
was an extensive congressional review process of all covert
152
actions. But it is unclear whether this process gave any significant
power to the congressional committees to hold the executive
147. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 390 (stating that “[i]n ninety-nine percent
of [the] cases the democratic safeguards of prior debate, consultation, established
procedures, and close monitoring [of intelligence actions] can be honored”). But
Johnson wrote his article in 1989, well before the advent of the current war on
terrorism. It may be naïve to say that almost all actions can be subject to this level
of debate and review, but the basic premise of the statement still has modern
validity.
148. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)(1) (2000).
149. Id. § 413b(c)(2)–(3).
150. See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 2005, at A15.
151. University Press of Kentucky: Biography of William J. Daugherty,
http://www.kentuckypress.com/PRdaugherty_bio.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
152. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 107 (listing multiple steps in the review
process). Daugherty states that annual and quarterly reviews were made by the
congressional intelligence committees of all covert actions both planned and in
operation. Id. Daugherty also recounts that the congressional committees could
request a briefing on any action at any time and that such requests “number[ed]
literally in the hundreds every year.” Id.
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branch accountable for perceived abuses of power. It is also
questionable whether such a review process is still used extensively
today.
An effective retrospective review process would undoubtedly
include an extensive review of the legal aspects surrounding
already executed covert actions and actions currently in process.
This legal analysis would be most effective and unbiased if it were
to come from lawyers not closely connected to the executive
153
branch or closely affiliated with any particular political party.
In
the Bush Administration, the legal analysis of intelligence activities
tends to come from lawyers within the administration who
maneuver around dissenting opinions rather than providing an
154
objective, measured analysis.
By implementing and executing a
more independent and retrospective congressional review process,
the legal justifications provided by the current Administration can
be checked without unduly hindering the ability of the executive
branch to protect the American people.
B. Composition of the Congressional Intelligence Committees
The power and responsibility to review covert action plans rests
155
with the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.
The importance of secrecy in covert activities requires that only a
limited number of members of Congress are kept informed of the
156
specifics and status of planned actions.
For these committees to
be effective in their review of covert action plans and other
intelligence information, it is essential that the senators and
representatives on these committees have adequate background on
153. See generally REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 141–42 (proposing the use
of lawyers with appropriate backgrounds in international law, but outside the
“chain of command” of the executive branch in assessing the legality of covert
actions abroad).
154. See Priest, supra note 127, at A1 (quoting William Mitchell College of Law
Professor A. John Radsan, a former CIA lawyer, who described the Bush
Administration’s “inner circle of lawyers and advisers work[ing] around the
dissenters in the Administration,” rather than having “a broad debate on whether
commander-in-chief powers can trump international conventions and domestic
statutes in our struggle against terrorism”).
155. Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 2004, at A1. See also supra Part II.C (describing the creation of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and their purposes).
156. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1) (2000) (prescribing requirements for the
President to promptly report covert actions to congressional intelligence
committees).
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the matters submitted for their review.
In the aftermath of 9/11, criticism has surfaced with regard to
the ability of the congressional intelligence committees to perform
157
their responsibilities.
Loch Johnson describes the oversight by
158
The
the committees as “by and large feckless and episodic.”
deterioration in the committees’ abilities has been linked to two
main factors. First, the complexity and volume of intelligence
159
information, including covert action, has increased substantially.
Committee members are inundated with immediate concerns and
daily briefings and little time remains for the broader duties of
160
analysis and review of proposed actions. Second, eight-year term
161
limits exist for all intelligence committee members.
Committee
members and outside experts say these term limits severely hinder
the members’ ability to develop a firm understanding of the very
162
complex world of intelligence. The learning curve for gaining an
adequate grasp on the inner workings of the CIA and other
intelligence agencies is apparently quite steep, and it is made
steeper by a passive resistance from the agencies to requests to
163
relinquish certain information. The result is two committees that
are under-experienced and ill-equipped to effectively execute all of
the duties assigned to them.
In order for the congressional intelligence committees to serve
effectively in the role of retrospective analyst and as a check on the
powers of the executive branch, the members of these committees
164
must be exceptionally capable.
Any power delegated to these
committees becomes useless if those using the power are spending
the majority of their time simply trying to understand intelligence
165
information, rather than applying a broader analysis.
Covert
157. See generally Priest, supra note 155, at A1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. One former committee member, Timothy J. Roemer (D–Ind.), said
the committees’ role in oversight and investigation “has almost gone away,”
because committee members are “so busy with the budget and keeping up with
daily events.” Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Senator Mike DeWine (R–Ohio), Representative Porter J. Goss
(R–Fla.), and “most other members of both [intelligence] committees say the term
limits should be abolished, at least for some members.” Id.
163. Id. The description of a steep learning curve and passive resistance came
from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence member Senator Mike DeWine
(R–Ohio). Id.
164. See generally id.
165. See generally id.
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actions are often executed quickly. Any hope of the intelligence
committees providing an additional voice to the process is
completely dependent upon having members who are well versed
in the specifics of intelligence operations.
To assure that the Senate and House intelligence committees
are better equipped to handle a new and evolving era of
intelligence, Congress should make certain changes.
First,
Congress should consider eliminating, or at least lengthening, term
166
limits for members of these committees. Eliminating term limits
does pose the risk of entrenched thinking and lower turnover. But
given the complexity of the issues involved, this risk is most likely
outweighed by the additional experience and discretion provided
by longer-term members. Second, Congress should consider
increasing the number of people involved in the intelligence
committees. This does not necessarily mean adding additional
members of Congress. At present, members of the House and
Senate intelligence committees do not have staffers available to
help them synthesize the great amounts of complex information
167
with which they must keep current.
This is obviously due to
confidentiality concerns, but perhaps it is time to consider lowering
the overall work load in order to assure a greater level of
understanding and analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of U.S. foreign affairs, especially in the
Middle East and Eastern Europe, leads to the conclusion that
covert action will continue to be an important tool for the United
States in combating a unique and ever-evolving enemy. The
success of covert actions is undeniably linked to an effective policy
of confidentiality to assure that planned actions are not
compromised and can have the maximum effect on the intended
target.
But as with any governmentally funded activity, covert actions
must be executed with the interests and priorities of the American
public in mind. The responsibility for ensuring that the executive
branch makes decisions aligned with public sentiment naturally
falls on members of the legislative branch. The congressional
committees on intelligence must be composed of capable,
166.
167.

See generally id. See also supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
Priest, supra note 155, at A1.
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knowledgeable, and experienced senators and representatives with
the ability to assess the immediate and future impacts of America’s
covert actions. The members of these committees are the key to
providing a regulatory component to a covert action planning
process that will continue to change and evolve with each new
conflict and every new administration.
To think that a standard, regimented, and completely
transparent process could be demanded of the executive branch
for approving and executing covert action is naïve. The current
state of national affairs requires that the President have the latitude
168
to act in the best interests of national security.
It is possible,
however, to impress our republican form of government upon the
covert action process by ensuring a measured system of checks and
balances for even this most secretive of government activities.

168. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001).
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